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Communications
With this issue, The International Lawyer inaugurates a
new, if occasional, department entitled "Communications." In
these pages, The International Lawyer will print signed communications received from readers on matters of current interest.
Usually these communications should be brief. However, in
view of the importance of the South-West Africa decision by
the World Court (1 Int. Lawyer 12 et seq.), the editor solicited
the views of Ernest A. Gross, who had served as counsel to
Ethiopia and Liberia.

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASE
A. GROSS
Dismissal by the International Court of Justice of the Applications of Ethiopia and Liberia on the preliminary, or "antecedent,"
ground of lack of standing, left without judicial resolution numerous
issues raised in the exceptionally voluminous pleadings and oral
proceedings on the merits. Under these circumstances, and in light
of the undoubted public interest in the litigation, it seems appropriate
to accept the invitation of the Editor-in-Chief of The International
Lawyer, to comment upon certain questions raised in the Symposium
on the World Court's Decision on South West Africa, held by the
Section of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar
Association in Montreal on August 8, 1966.
In the interest of clarity and accuracy, the several questions
dealt with below are cast in the form of "Contention" and "Comment."
Unless otherwise indicated, each "Contention" is quoted from statements made by Mr. Hynning during the course of his remarks at
the Symposium. Whenever possible, citations are given in the
relevant "Comment." It is left to the interested reader to consult
the record of the Court proceedings for the purpose of evaluating
both content and context of the points made.
ERNEST

(I)
(a) Contention. "[The Applicants] withdrew any charges of
oppression of the indigenous population and drew just one issue:
whether the policy of apartheid or separate facilities, separate treatment of population on racial grounds, violated per se the clause of
the Mandate which said that the Mandatory had a sacred trust
256
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for civilization and must do the utmost to promote the welfare of
the inhabitants of the territory." 1
(b) Comment. At an early stage of the litigation, long before
the commencement of Oral Proceedings and presentation of witnesses,
the South African Government injected the theme, or contention, that
the Applicants had "abandoned their original charges of oppression."
South Africa at all times has ignored repeated efforts on the part
of the Applicants, in both Written Pleadings and Oral Proceedings,
to make clear that (1) their "charge" was not, and never had been,
that South Africa's violation of the "welfare clause" of the Mandate
consisted in the purpose of its officials who might be in office from
time to time, but in the objectively determined consequences of its
undisputed racial policy and practices and (2) that, in any event,
the "oppressive" or "injurious" effect of a policy of official racial
discrimination is an inference or conclusion to be drawn from the
facts, rather than an averment of fact.
The South African strategy in this regard has been to portray
the Applicants' clarifications and explanations of the true theory
of their case as a "dramatic surrender," in the words of the South
African Representative, in his Statement to the General Assembly
on September 26, 1966." The Applicants never entertained the
slightest doubt that the Court would correctly analyze the issue thus
sharply focussed. In the event, of course, the Court's failure to adjudicate upon the real merits left this matter without judicial resolution.3
1 Int. Lawyer 17. The related question of the so-called "admission" by the
Applicants of all of Respondent's averments, is dealt with separately infra,
pp. 263-267.
2 A/P.V. 1418; 26 Sept. 1966. As an elaboration of the theme, South Africa
asserts that the Applicants "formally amended their Submissions so as to omit
and abandon all the charges of oppression." Ibid.
3 "The gravamen of the Applicants' complaint in both sets of Submissions
(i.e., the original submissions and the final submissions, which incorporated
verbal and up-dating modifications) is the practice of apartheid which they say
is, by its nature, oppressive, arbitrary and inhuman and, therefore, incompatible
with the Respondent's obligations under Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Mandate.
That complaint has not changed and remains the same in the original as well as
in the final submissions. The facts relied upon by the Applicants in support of
their Submissions 3 and 4 are certain laws, regulations and official measures
introduced in the territory by the Respondent which are listed in the Applications and amplified in the Memorials . . ." Dissenting Opinion of ad hoc
Judge Sir Louis Mbanefo; I.C.J. Reports 1966, at p. 486, italics added.
". .. Submissions 3 and 4 in the Memorials, at page 197 . . . are not
fundamentally different from the above-mentioned final submissions 3 and 4."
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka of Japan; I.C.J. Reports 1966, at p. 283.
1
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Proper evaluation of the South African assertion that, somewhere
along the route, the Applicants suddenly made a volte face and
abandoned "charges of oppression," requires scrutiny of the actual
evolution of the Pleadings in regard to Article 2 of the Mandate.
The real issue never was actually joined by the Respondent.
The essence of the complaint concerning Article 2, set out in
the Applications filed in November 1960, is correctly formulated
by Judge Mbanefo in the excerpt quoted from his Dissenting Opinion
(footnote 3 above).' The Applicants' case in this regard, first and
last, always has been that the policy and practice of apartheid,according to which rights, privileges and burdens are officially allocated
on the basis of race, without regard to individual merit or capacity,
are inherently and necessarily incompatible with the obligation to
promote human welfare and social progress.
In their Memorials, the Applicants contended, under the caption
"Legal Conclusions" (following a detailed exposition of the Respondent's actual policies and practices in the economic, political, social
and educational lives of the inhabitants):
"The factual record of the Mandatory's conduct, as hereinabove
more particularly set forth, has a desolate but remarkable consistency.
Whatever segment or sector of the life of the Territory may be
examined, the import of the facts is identical .

.

.

. Particular laws

and particular practices, particular orders and particular acts are all
parts of a cohesive and systematic pattern of behavior by the Mandatory which inhibits the well-being, the social progress and the development of the overwhelming majority of the people of South West
Africa, in all significant phases of the life of the Territory .

.

..

In its first Pleading on the merits (the Counter-Memorial), South
Africa, much to the surprise of the Applicants, interpreted their
contention as follows:
"The case alleged against Respondent, in regard to the suggested
4To the same effect, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jessup: "There is
no need and there is no intention here to impugn South Africa's motives; they
have not been put in issue." (ICJ Reports 1966, at p. 434); ". . . it must be
concluded that the task of passing upon the Applicants' third submission which
asserts that the practice of apartheid is in violation of the Mandatory's obliga-

tions as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant Qf
the League of Nations is a justiciable issue, not just a political question." (Id.
at p. 442; italics added.)
Memorials, p. 132. The laws, practices and acts complained of were specified in the Memorials, and summarized in the Oral Proceedings, in C.R. 65/33.
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breach of Article 2 of the Mandate, is one of bad faith in the exercise
of its powers in terms of the said article, in the sense that it has
pursued actions ostensibly within its powers for a purpose not authorized thereby." "
Going further, South Africa argued that, on its theory of the
Mandate obligation,
C6.*. no act or omission on Respondent's part would constitute
a violation of this Article unless such act or omission was actuated
by an intention, or directed at a purpose, other than to promote the
interests of the inhabitants of the Territory."
Needless to say, the Applicants strenuously rejected both the
misinterpretation of their complaint and the legal premise asserted
by South Africa in regard to the proper construction of the Mandate
Article in question. In their Reply to the Counter-Memorial, the
Applicants explicitly made clear that their dispute with South Africa
regarding the performance of its obligations under Article 2 hinges
"upon an objective valuation of its conduct," not upon an "issue of
Respondent's good or bad faith." ' It was pointed out that characterization of South African policies and objectives in terms such as
"systematically," "deliberately," and the like, were not factual averments. They are inferences or conclusions, reflecting the universally
accepted axiom that the reasonably predictable effects of conduct
are presumed to be intended. No subjective test of "bona fides" is
relevant. The oppressive, or detrimental, effects of a policy of official
racial discrimination are judgments flowing from the policies and
practices themselves. The latter, as the Applicants pointed out in
their Reply, are "the decisively relevant facts" the existence of which
(in the form of laws, regulations and administrative measures and
practices) is undisputed, and largely derived from Respondent's own
pleadings. At the Oral Proceedings, as has been pointed out (footnote
5, above) the Applicants catalogued relevant laws and regulations
largely on the basis of citations from the South African pleadings.
South Africa's next (and final) written pleading was its Rejoinder. This was the debut of what was to become a persistent and
strident tactic.'
';Counter-Memorial, Vol. IV, at p. 17.
Id. at p. 12.

1 Reply, at p. 38.
11The South African Information Service, and other official agencies of that
Government, have disseminated widely the contention that the Applicants
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2
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The Rejoinder formulated the contention in somewhat less melodramatic terms than "surrender," as follows:
". .. Applicants have in the Reply introduced a new cause
of action in attempted support of their Submissions 3 and 4, and
have manifested a major shift from the stand taken in that regard
in the Memorials. Possibly Applicants have realized, in the light
of the exposition given in the Counter-Memorial,that their charges of
deliberate oppression are not supported or supportable by the
facts . . . . Be that as it may, that there has been a major shifting
of ground is beyond question." 10
On further reflection, however, the Respondent apparently
concluded that there had not been such a "major shifting" after all.
In the pages of the Rejoinder immediately following the excerpt
just quoted, the Respondent concluded "that the Applicants still rely
on the allegation that Respondent's policy is directed at the unauthorized purpose of oppressing the Natives for the benefit of the European
inhabitants of the Territory, and that their factual discussion is introduced for the purpose of establishing such allegation." 11
It seems fair to say that South Africa's rejection of the Applicants' explanation of their own pleadings, coupled with the Respondent's ambivalent treatment of this issue in its Rejoinder, left the
matter obscure when the Oral Proceedings opened. It is, however,
the purpose of oral arguments to unmuddy the waters and we turn
now to the events which took place before the Court.
South Africa made known at the commencement of the Oral
Proceedings its intention to produce numerous witnesses, as well
as to propose that the Court visit South West Africa, South Africa,
Ethiopia, Liberia and two other African states, to be determined
by the Court. On the theory of the Applicants' case, as it had been
presented from the beginning, neither oral testimony nor "inspection
in loco" could have a bearing on the inferences and conclusions
properly to be drawn from the undisputed laws, regulations and
practices comprising apartheid. For precisely the same reason, no
"abandoned charges of oppression" during the course of the Oral Proceedings.
As is shown immediately below, however, the South African contention in this
regard actually originated in its Reply and merely was renewed during the Oral
Proceedings and repeated publicly thereafter.
10 Rejoinder, Vol. I, p. 116.

11 2d. at p. 118.
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point or purpose would have been served by the Applicants calling
witnesses.' 2
The Applicants explained on many occasions during the Proceedings why they regarded the taking of testimony (which in fact
added at least six months to the litigation), or an "inspection" (which
might have lengthened the Proceedings by another year) as dilatory
and diversionary. One example of such explanations is the following
(Applicants' Oral Argument of July 1, 1965):
"Our contention is that this Court should find that the policy
and practices of apartheid are so inherently inconsistent with moral
welfare and social progress, that weighing and balancing material
benefits is irrelevant, and that the Respondent's purpose is irrelevant,
and that there is no way by an application of weights and measures
to determine whether an individual's moral welfare has been impaired
or thwarted by disabilities placed upon him on the basis of race.
How is the Court to examine that question on the basis of inspection
or on the basis of testimony? It is a qualitative factor, and it is only
in this sense that the Applicants have contended, and continue to
submit that the effect of this policy and these practices upon moral
welfare, is inherently injurious, and is impermissible under this
Mandate." 1
The Applicants never modified this position, or retreated from
12 Mr. Hynning comments (1 Int. Lawyer 38) that he was "really startled"
when the Applicants declined to call any witnesses. "Here we had had debates
within the General Assembly of the U.N. stretching from 1946 until yesterday
or today, and there has been a complaint they haven't had a forum in which to
make charges against South Africa and to controvert the denials by South Africa
that the maximum interests of the indigenous population were not being promoted. Here was a tailor-made opportunity in an international forum to present witnesses, to give oral testimony, to cross-examine. What a magnificent
opportunity for the African states to make a case against South Africa! Then
their counsel threw it away-by calling no witnesses, by saying he conceded
everything South Africa has averred or has denied, and by not questioning it.
Now I do not understand why that was done. The implication of course, is that
the African states did not have the evidence to show that the indigenous population of South Africa [sic] was being oppressed or treated in a manner differently from certain indigenous populations in other parts of Africa .... ." The
actual explanation is that, in the Applicants' view, the relevant evidence set out
in the Written Pleadings conclusively established their case. Witnesses called
by the Applicants no doubt might have added drama, but it never was the
Applicants' purpose to stage a "show trial."

13

C.R. 65/53, at pp. 43-44.
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it. This is explicitly made clear in their last summation, made at the
conclusion of the Oral Proceedings in Novembel 1965, as follows:
"The laws and regulations, and the official methods and measures
by which they are effectuated, the existence of which is conceded
by Respondent and is on record as evidence, constitute a policy and
practice of racial discrimination of an extreme and virulent nature,
which is universally condemned as such. Such a policy, established
by such evidence, is inherently and per se incompatible with moral
well-being and social progress, not only in the Mandated Territory
but . . . anywhere, at any time, and under any circumstances. It
is on this basis and for this reason that the Applicants have maintained
that no evidence additionalto that already in the record in the written
pleadings is necessary or relevant to their case, whether such further
evidence is in the form of testimony or inspection." "
Notwithstanding the foregoing history of the Applicants' Pleadings and Oral Arguments in respect of the nature of their complaint
of violation of Article 2 of the Mandate, South Africa has persisted
in disseminating its version of the Applicants' case. Thus, in a statement before the United Nations General Assembly on September
26, 1966, the South African Representative repeated the familiar
theme:
"The substantive question . . . was whether the policies and
measures applied by South Africa by whatever name they might be
called, were in fact oppressive of the indigenous peoples of the
Territory, as was alleged. The Applicants in their pleadings emphasized that the question was one of fact. They said 'we speak . . . of
apdlrtheid as a fact and not as a word,' and then went on to allege
that apartheid was a system whereby the 'Native' or indigenous
inhabitants of the Territory were deliberately suppressed and oppressed for the benefit of the White minority." (A/P.V. 1418.)
It is this play between the legal concept of a fact, as distinct
from a conclusion, which forms the semantic foundation of South
Africa's repeated public declarations that the Applicants, by amending their Submissions, or otherwise, had "abandoned all their charges
of oppression."
The same confusion between fact and conclusion likewise underlies South Africa's insistence that the "whole dramtic surrender" also is manifest from the "acceptance" by the Applicants
14 Oral Proceedings of November 9, 1965; C.R. 65/96, at pp. 22-23 (italics
international Lawyer, Vol. I,No. 2
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of "all the averments of fact in South Africa's pleadings" and that
they relied solely upon "an absolute rule, which prohibited all official
distinctions between persons on the basis of membership in a race,
class or group, whether or not such distinctions were intended to
operate, and in fact operated, for the benefit of everyone concerned."
The confusion between fact and conclusion is strikingly revealed
in the italicized clause, just quoted. As has been shown above, the
Applicants contended throughout that the racial laws and regulations
applied in the Territory inherently operate to the detriment of the
indigenous population. This conclusion, they insisted, did not involve
the application of an "absolute rule," but was a judgment compelled
by the application of objectively determinable standards or criteria
universally accepted in the international community and the laws
and practice of States.
The real nature of the Applicants' "acceptance" of South African
averments, and the significance properly to be attributed to what in
fact transpired are examined immediately below.
(Ii)
(a) Contention. "[The Applicants] conceded in a written submission to the Court that there were no factual disputes with South
Africa. [The Applicants] withdrew any charges of oppression of the
indigenous population and drew just one issue: whether the policy of
apartheid or separate facilities, separate treatment of population on
racial grounds, violated per se the clause of the Mandate which said
that the Mandatory had a sacred trust for civilization and must do
the utmost to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory.
[The Applicants said they] did not controvert in any manner any of
the factual allegations or denials by South Africa.

.

.

. This case

was decided on a record which contained no allegations of any
kind of mistreatment of the indigenous population but did contain
the pattern of legislation which is called apartheid, which provides
for separate treatment of legal rights, public services and facilities,
and private services and facilities." ".
(b) Comment. The very formulation of the contention quoted
above invites attention to the premises upon which it rests.
First, the Applicants did not "concede" that there were no
"factual disputes with South Africa." The Applicants at all times
insisted that "the decisively relevant facts concerning Applicants'
15 1 Int. Lawyer 17-18, including n. 7.
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Submissions 3 and 4 (the apartheid issue) are undisputed." 16 These
facts, in the Applicants' submission, consisted of racial laws, regulations and administrative measures, the existence of all of which was
conceded by South Africa. The latter, on the other hand, never was
willing to join issue on the basis of the Applicants' theory of the
case. It was for the Respondent, not the Applicants, to request
"summary judgment."
Secondly, the Applicants insisted that a policy of official racial
discrimination per se constitutes "mistreatment of the native population."

17

Thirdly, the description of apartheid as a system of "separate
treatment of legal rights" bears no recognizable relation to the system
of apartheid as characterized by the Applicants. The essence of
apartheid, as described by the Applicants, and as universally condemned by virtually all members of the international community,
is the official denial of equal protection of the laws and of equality
of rights and opportunity on the basis of race.
Fourthly, the comment that the Applicants admitted "every
factual defense of South Africa" is to be read in the light of the
reservations quoted by Mr. Hynning in his statement. (Footnote 7).
As is apparent therefrom, the Applicants accepted only such allegations of fact as were relevant upon the Applicants' theory of the case,
and they explicitly distinguished between averments of fact properly
so called, and conclusions, inferences or argumentative characterizations."8
Heavy play has been made by South African public information
services and official statements of the theme that the Applicants
abandoned their "charges of oppression" and admitted the truth of
all South Africa's averments concerning the effect of apartheid. It
would have been "startling" indeed, and not only to Mr. Hynning,
16Reply, at p. 43, and see Oral Proceedings, November 9, 1965, C.R.
65/96, at p. 21.
17 This contention
was advanced in their Written Pleadings, maintained

throughout, and repeated in their closing statement to the Court on November
10, 1965: "The Applicants' contention is that official racial discrimination is
inherently incompatible with social progress and human welfare." (C.R. 65/96,
at p. 20.)
"I Thus, the Applicants took sharp issue with South Africa's insistence that
the former had made a so-called "factual charge of oppression" and hence that
South Africa's "denial of oppression" was a factual averment" admitted by
the Applicants. In the Applicants' view, the oppressive quality or effect of
conduct is a conclusion to be drawn from the conduct itself.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2
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if such a description of what actually happened were accurate.
Moreover, the world press, which daily covered the proceedings,
would have been remiss indeed not to convey such news to an incredulous public. And the African Governments, particularly those
directly participating in the Proceedings, would have been justifiedto say the least-in rebuking and disavowing Counsel. 9
On the basis of their contention that the "decisively relevant
facts" were undisputed, the Applicants-from the outset of the Oral
Proceedings-sought to find some agreed procedure which could
avoid excessively protracted Oral Proceedings. In March, 1965,
when the Oral Arguments commenced, the South West Africa case
already had been before the Court for four years and four months.
The Written Pleadings were unprecedently voluminous. South Africa,
as has been noted, announced the intention to call some thirty-eight
witnesses."0
The Applicants not only sought to shorten the Proceedings to
reasonable limits by offering a stipulation for the taking of depositions.
In addition, they made a conscientious effort to cooperate with the
Court and the Respondent by making it clear that the facts upon
which the Applicants relied could be regarded as agreed. This did
not in any manner involve or imply a "change" of their position,
to say nothing of "abandonment" or "surrender." The actual intention
of the Applicants is clear from the very quotation given by Mr.
Hynning in his discussion of the case. Thus, the "Agreement Regarding Factual Averments" proferred by the Applicants at the outset of
the Proceedings, stated, inter alia:
"Subject to reserving their right to contest the relevance of facts
contained in the Respondent's pleadings, including the oral pro19 To the contrary, the Delegations of Ethiopia and Liberia, fully conversant
with the record, explained in detail to the General Assembly how and why
the South African representations were based upon distortions, rendered out
of context. (See, e.g., Statement by Secretary of State Grimes of Liberia, on
October 7, 1966; A/PV. 1433, at pp. 73 fl; Statement by Representative of
Ethiopia, on October 5, 1966; A/PV. 1431, at pp. 128 fl.)
20 In the event, fourteen witnesses were produced by South Africa, a course
which necessitated a Winter session of Court, thereby adding at least four
months. On the Applicants' submissions, not only was this testimony unnecessary, but most of it duplicated material in the South African Written Pleadings.
Furthermore, all of it could have been added to the Record in documentary
form, as the Applicants proposed, by a procedure of depositions. South
Africa's insistence upon adducing the evidence viva voce was, however, upheld
by the Court.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2
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ceedings, Applicants agree that such facts-as distinct from inferences
which may be drawn therefrom-are not contested, except as otherwise indicated, specifically or by implication, in Applicants' Written
Pleadings or in the oral proceedings." 21
Similarly, in the oral proceeding of April 27, 1965, the Applicants advised the Court (consistently with their position explicitly
set forth in their Reply and maintained thereafter) that:
"All facts set forth in this record, which, upon the Applicants'
theory of the case are relevant to its contentions of law, are undisputed." 2
On May 3, 1965, South African Counsel asked: "What do the
Applicants mean by the expression 'averments of fact?' " The Applicants made explicit response on May 17, 1965, and again during
their closing statements on November 9, 1965, as follows:
"In the verbatim record C.R. 65/33, 17 May, the Applicants
have set out what was described as an 'illustrative enumeration' of
laws and regulations, official methods and measures, the existence
of which is conceded by Respondent and upon which the Applicants
rely, and which, of course, stand undisputed in the record. In describing the legal significance of the 'illustrative enumeration' of
these facts, the Applicants stated, and I quote from page 35 of the
verbatim record C.R. 65/33:
'These [the illustrative enumerated facts or, as the Respondent
calls them, the catalogue of facts], and similarly conceded existent legislation and administrative measures, and effectuating
policies and practices, form the corpus of factual material or
describe the pattern of Respondent's conduct, which is known
and characterized widely as "apartheid"
'In the Applicants' further submission, no evidence or testimony in purported explanation or extenuation thereof is legally
relevant to the issues joined in these proceedings.' "2
The foregoing excerpts from the record of the Proceedings likewise gives the answer to the query implied in Mr. Carey's comment
that "for some reason, the Applicants decided they did not like that
proposal" (i.e., the proposal that the Court visit South West Africa).2
In addition to the fact that such a process would have been dilatory,
21

1 Int. Lawyer 18, n.7; italics added.

2" Id.; italics added.
22 C.R. 65/96, at p.
24

25; italics added.

1 Int. Lawyer 36.
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expensive and superfluous, it should be noted that the South African
invitation did not contemplate that the Court would interview any
witnesses, take testimony, or even "talk to" the inhabitants.25
(III)
(a) Contention. "The Court also thought that the issues of race
relationships are going beyond the legal, and are getting into a political area and that it didn't want to do this, if it could avoid it. I think
it tried to find a way out; I think it properly found itself out of jurisdiction." 28
(b) Comment. Mr. Carey correctly responded to the foregoing
contention, pointing out that the Applicants "were not asking the
Court to apply morals in order to save their position. Ethiopia and
Liberia were asking the Court to apply law. They were asking the
Court to apply the jurisdiction provision to which South Africa agreed
those many years before." 27 It should be noted that the court did
not "find itself out of jurisdiction."
In view of the Court's failure to pass upon the "real merits" of
the case (in Judge Jessup's phrase), the motivations of the Judges
remain a matter of speculation.
Without in any way indulging in such speculation, it is pertinent
to note a viewpoint expressed in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of
Judges Spender (Australia) and Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom),
appended to the Court's 1962 Judgment. The two learned Judges
commented that it is "legitimate for a Court, in considering the jurisdictional aspects of any case, to take into account a factor which is
fundamental to the jurisdiction of any tribunal, namely, whether the
issues arising on the merits are such as to be capable of objective legal
determination."
Referring explicitly to Article 2 of the Mandate (the "well-being
and social progress" clause) the two Judges concluded:
"They (the terms of Article 2) involve questions of appreciation
25 South Africa, in response to an inquiry by the Applicants as to the scope
and limits of the invitation, replied: "There is no suggestion that if one inspects,
then one must have evidence, and there was never any such suggestion from
our side. There was never any suggestion that if the Court is to inform itself
about the ways in which people live, about the standards on which they live,
about the differences between them, and so forth, the Court is to talk to
those people or have any evidence in that regard. The Court will see for
itself-it will see those things." C.R. 65/25, at p. 55.
26 1 Int. Lawyer 33.
27 1 Int. Lawyer 34.
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rather than of objective determination. As at present advised we have
serious misgivings as to the legal basis on which the necessary objective criteria can be founded." 28
In their Reply the Applicants set forth, in extenso, the multitude
of sources supporting their contention that there are indeed standards,
or "objective criteria," in the light of which a judicial tribunal could
and should interpret and apply Article 2 of the Mandate."
The Applicants contended that the standards which should
govern judicial interpretation of Article 2 of the Mandate were so
overwhelming, particularly in relation to the extreme form of official
racial discrimination known as apartheid,that the undisputed record
of South African racial laws, regulations and practices applied in
South West Africa compelled the legal conclusion that the moral wellbeing and social progress of the inhabitants are thwarted, rather than
promoted thereby.
The Applicants considered that the sources which they cited
were sufficiently conclusive to justify the alternative and cumulative
contention that---even apart from the specific mandate obligation-the
official policy of racial discrimination should be found by the Court
to violate a generally accepted rule, or norm, of international law. 0
It should be emphasized that the latter contention, i.e., the existence of an "international legal norm," was alternative to the major
contention which, in the Applicants' words, was that there "have
evolved standards of non-discrimination and non-separation which
govern authoritatively the interpretation of Article 2 of the
Mandate." 1
The alternative character of the Applicants' contention was regularly confused by South Africa in leading its witnesses, as well as in
oral argument, notwithstanding repeated objections made by the
Applicants.
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319, at pp. 466-467.
Such sources included international undertakings in the form of treaties,
conventions and declarations, judicial decisions, the practice of States and
constitutional and statutory provisions, all of which proscribe official race
discrimination, or which protect equality of opportunity and equal protection
of the laws to individual persons as such. (Attention is invited to the Applicants'
Reply, pages 274-293.)
30 The Applicants' argument in support of the latter alternative contention
may be found in the Oral Proceedings of May 19, 1965; C.R. 65/35, at pp.
28
29

5,f.
31

C.R. 65/35, at p. 5.
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The confusion was compounded by South Africa's insistencereflected in the excerpt from Judge van Wyk's concurring opinion,
quoted by Mr. Hynning-that
"Applicants' final attitude was that there existed no dispute of
fact between the Parties, inasmuch as Applicants had accepted all
Respondent's averments and denials, and had stated clearly
their whole case was based on the existence of the alleged norm or
standards." 3
With respect, it must be obvious that the quoted comment suffers
from a built-in non sequitur which, perhaps, is attributable to the
Respondent's faulty premise as to what Applicants actually had
"accepted," for the purpose of these Proceedings.
It would have been a logical absurdity for the Applicants to "base
their whole case on the existence of the alleged norm or standards,"
without a factual evidentiary foundation on which the Court could
predicate judicial inferences and legal conclusions. In regard to the
contention that objectively determinable standards existed which
should be applied by the Court in its interpretation of the Mandateas well as the Applicants' alternative (and cumulative) contention
that an international legal norm proscribing apartheidshould be found
by the Court to exist-the factual and evidentiary basis upon which the
Applicants always relied were the undisputed laws, regulations and
practices comprising apartheid."
In conclusion, and as must be clear from the record of the litigation, the Applicants and the Respondent really never joined issue
either on the legal basis of the Applicants' case or on the evidentiary
or factual foundation on which the Applicants were prepared to submit their case in respect of Article 2 of the Mandate.
During the Oral Proceedings-entirely consistently with their
Written Pleadings, the Applicants stated that they
"rest their case on the basis of such laws, regulations and official
32 1 Int. Lawyer 18, n. 7.; C.R. 65/31 at p. 32. The true "attitude" of the
Applicants in regard to the undisputed facts has been discussed above.
33 A climax of absurdity was reached during the Oral Proceedings when
South African Counsel ascribed to the Applicants "the attitude . . .that all
evidence is irrelevant." (!) (C.R. 65/89, at p. 62.) As pointed out above,
the actual position of the Applicants was that "no evidence additional to that
already in the record in the written pleadings is necessary or relevant to their
case . . ." (C.R. 65/96, at p. 23.) The decisively relevant evidence, consisting of racial laws, regulations and practices were fully summarized in
the Oral Proceedings, C.R. 65/33.
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methods and measures of implementation, which comprise the policy
and practice of apartheid and the Applicants limit themselves to those
laws, regulations, measures and methods, the existence of which is
conceded by Respondent. The Applicants contend that apartheid
constitues a per se violation of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Mandate
.. . The approach, the policy and the practices which characterize apartheidare inherently and per se incompatible with the objectives of the social order in contemporary society anywhere in the
world, under all circumstances, and at any time."
EDITOR'S NOTE:
The majority opinion of the World Court contains in haec verba
the original applications of Ethiopia and Liberia to the Court and the
submissions as presented to the Court at its oral proceedings. The following excerpts relate to apartheid and the conduct of South Africa
which,, in the Applications, was labeled "arbitrary, unreasonable,
unjust and detrimental to human dignity" or "which suppress the
rights and liberties of the inhabitants."
A. From the original applications (November 4, 1960):
"F. The Union, in administering the Territory, has practised
apartheid, i.e. has distinguished as to race, color, national or tribal
origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the
Territory; that such practice is in violation of Article 2 of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty
forthwith to cease the practice of apartheidin the Territory.
"G. The Union, in administering the Territory, has adopted and
applied legislation, regulations, proclamations, and administrative
decrees which are by their terms and in their application, arbitrary,
unreasonable, unjust and detrimental to human dignity; that the foregoing actions by the Union violate Article 2 of the Mandate and Article
22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forthwith to repeal
and not to apply such legislation, regulations, proclamations, and administrative decrees.
"H. The Union has adopted and applied legislation, administrative regulations, and official actions which suppress the rights and
liberties of inhabitants of the Territory essential to their orderly evolution toward self-government, the right to which is implicit in the Cov34

C.R. 65/25, at pp. 7, 19.
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enant of the League of Nations, the terms of the Mandate, and currently accepted international standards, as embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights; that the
foregoing actions by the Union violate Article 2 of the Mandate and
Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forthwith
to cease and desist from any action which thwarts the orderly development of self-government in the Territory."
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 11.
B. From the memorials (April):
"3. the Union, in the respects set forth in Chapter V of this
Memorial and summarized in Paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof, has
practised apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to race, color, national
or tribal origin in establishing the rights and duties of the violation
of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article
22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that the Union
has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in the
Territory;
"4. the Union, by virtue of the economic, political, social
and educational policies applied within the Territory, which are
described in detail in Chapter V of this Memorial and summarized
at Paragraph 19 thereof, has failed to promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants
of the Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty
forthwith to cease its violations as afore said and to take all practicable actions to fulfill its duties under such Articles; ibid, p. 12."
C. From the final submissions (May 19, 1965):
"(3) Respondent, by laws and regulations, and official methods
and measures, which are set out in the pleadings herein, has practised
apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to race, colour, national or tribal
origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the
Territory; that such practice is in violation of its obligations as stated
in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations; and that Respondent has the duty forthwith to
cease the practice of apartheid in the Territory.
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"(4) Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social and
educational policies applied within the Territory, by means of laws
and regulations, and official methods and measures, which are set
out in the pleadings herein, has, in the light of applicable international
standards or international legal norm, or both, failed to promote to
the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of
the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation
of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant; and that Respondent has the duty forthwith to cease
its violations as aforesaid and to take all practicable action to fulfill its
duties under such Articles." Ibid., p. 15.

International Lawyer, Vol. 1. No. 2

